This paper investigates optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare spending under Epstein-Zin preferences. Given consumption and healthcare spending plans, Epstein-Zin utilities are defined over an agent's random lifetime, partially controllable by the agent as healthcare reduces Gompertz' natural growth rate of mortality. In a Black-Scholes market, the stochastic optimization problem is solved through the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. Compared with classical Epstein-Zin utility maximization, the additional controlled mortality process complicates the uniqueness of Epstein-Zin utilities and verification arguments. A combination of probabilistic arguments and analysis of the HJB equation are required to resolve the challenges. In contrast to prior work under time-separable utilities, Epstein-Zin preferences largely facilitate calibration. In five different countries we examined, the model-generated mortality closely approximates actual mortality data; moreover, the calibrated efficacy of healthcare is in close agreement with empirical studies on healthcare across countries. MSC (2010): 91G10, 93E20. JEL: G11, I12
Introduction
Mortality, the probability that someone alive today dies next year, exhibits an approximate exponential growth with age, an observation made by Gompertz [13] in the early 19th century. Despite the steady decline of mortality at all age groups across different generations, the exponential growth of mortality within each generation has remained remarkably stable, which is called the Gompertz law. Figure 1 displays this clearly: in the US, mortality of the cohort born in 1900 (blue dots) and that of the cohort born in 1940 (red dots) grew exponentially at a similar rate; the latter is essentially shifted down from the former. 1 At the intuitive level, the steady decline of mortality across generations can be ascribed to the continuous improvement of healthcare and accumulation of wealth. Understanding the precise relations among healthcare, wealth, and mortality demands a general model in which wealth evolution, healthcare choices, and the resulting mortality are all endogenous. Standard models of optimal consumption and investment do not seem to serve the purpose: the majority, e.g. [34] , [24] , [25] , and [29] , consider no more than exogenous mortality, leaving no room for healthcare. 2 Recently, Guasoni and Huang [15] directly modeled the effect of healthcare on mortality: healthcare reduces Gompertz' natural growth rate of mortality, through an efficacy function that characterizes the effect of healthcare spending in a society. Healthcare, as a result, indirectly increases utility from consumption accumulated over a longer lifetime. Under the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function U (x) = x 1−γ 1−γ , 0 < γ < 1, an optimal strategy of consumption, investment, and healthcare spending is derived in [15] , where the constraint 0 < γ < 1 is justified by interpreting 1/γ as an agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Specifically, to model mortality endogenously, we need to be cautious of potential preference for death over life. To avoid this, [15] assumes that an agent can leave a fraction ζ ∈ (0, 1], not necessarily all, of his wealth at death to beneficiaries, reflecting the effect of inheritance and estate taxes. It is shown in [15] that the optimization problem is ill-posed for γ > 1. Indeed, with γ > 1, or EIS less than one, the income effect of future loss of wealth at death is so substantial that the agent reduces current consumption to zero, leading to the ill-posedness; see below [15, Proposition 3.2] for details.
Despite the progress in [15] , the artificial relation that EIS is the reciprocal of relative risk aversion, forced by CRRA utility functions, significantly restricts its applications. Although a preliminary calibration was carried out in [15, Section 5] , it was not based on the full-fledged model in [15] , but a simplified version without any risky asset. Indeed, once a risky asset is considered, it is unclear whether γ should be calibrated to relative risk aversion or EIS. More crucially, empirical studies largely reject that relative risk aversion and EIS are reciprocals to each other: it is widely accepted that EIS is larger than one (see e.g. [3] , [2] , [6] , and [5] ), while numerous estimates of relative risk aversion are also larger than one (see e.g. [31] , [3] , and [17] ).
In this paper, we investigate optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare spending under preferences of Epstein-Zin type, which disentangle relative risk aversion (denoted by 0 < γ = 1) and EIS (denoted by ψ > 0). In particular, we assume throughout the paper ψ > 1 and γ > 1/ψ, (1.1) which implies a preference for early resolution of uncertainty (as explained in [30] ), and conforms to empirical estimations mentioned above. Our Epstein-Zin utility process has several distinctive features. First, it is defined on a random horizon τ , the death time of an agent. Prior studies on Epstein-Zin utilities focus on a fixed-time horizon; see e.g. [9] , [27] , [22] , [28] , [21] , and [33] . To the best our knowledge, random-horizon Epstein-Zin utilities are developed for the first time in Aurand and Huang [1] , where the horizon is assumed to be a stopping time adapted to the market filtration. Our studies complement [1] , by allowing for a stopping time (i.e. the death time) that need not depend on the financial market. Second, the random horizon τ is controllable: one slows the growth of mortality via healthcare spending, which in turn changes the distribution of τ . Note that a controllable random horizon is rarely discussed in stochastic control, even under time-separable utilities. Third, to formulate our Epstein-Zin utilities, we need not only a given consumption stream c (as in the literature), but also a specified healthcare spending process h. Given the pair (c, h), the Epstein-Zin utility is defined as the right-continuous process V c,h that satisfies a random-horizon dynamics (i.e. (2.6) below), with a jump at time τ . Thanks to techniques of filtration expansion, we decompose V c,h as a function of τ and a process V c,h that solves an infinite-horizon backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) under solely the market filtration; see Proposition 2.1. That is, the randomness from death and from the market can be dealt with separately. By deriving a comparison result for this infinite-horizon BSDE (Proposition 2.2), we are able to uniquely determine the Epstein-Zin utility V c,h for any k-admissible strategy (c, h) (Definition 2.3); see Theorem 2.1.
In a Black-Scholes financial market, we maximize the time-0 Epstein-Zin utility V c,h 0 over permissible strategies (c, π, h) of consumption, investment, and healthcare spending (Definition 4.2). First, we derive the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, from which a candidate optimal strategy (c * , π * , h * ) can be deduced. Taking advantage of a scaling property of the HJB equation, we reduce it to a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE), for which a unique classical solution exists on strength of the Perron method construction in [15] . This, together with a general verification theorem (Theorem 3.1), yields the optimality of (c * , π * , h * ); see Theorem 4.1, the major result of this paper.
Compared with classical Epstein-Zin utility maximization, the additional controlled mortality process M h in our case adds nontrivial complexity. In deriving the comparison result Proposition 2.2, standard Gronwall's inequality cannot be applied due to the inclusion of M h . As shown in Appendix A.2, a transformation of processes, as well as the use of both forward and backward Gronwall's inequalities, are required to circumvent this issue. On the other hand, in carrying out verification arguments, we need to contain the growth of M h properly to ensure that the Epstein-Zin utility is well-defined. This is done through a combination of probabilistic arguments and analysis of the aforementioned nonlinear ODE; see Appendix B.2 for details.
Our model is calibrated to mortality data in the US, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Hungary, leading to three intriguing findings. First, our model-implied mortality closely approximates the actual mortality data. Under the simplifying assumptions that the cohort born in 1900 had no healthcare and the cohort born in 1940 had full access to healthcare, we use our model to generate an endogenous mortality curve for the 1940 cohort. Figure 1 shows that the model-implied mortality (the red line) essentially reproduces actual data (the red dots). Our model performs well for not only the US data, but those from other countries as well; see Figure 3 . Second, as shown in Figure 2 , the calibrated efficacy functions of healthcare (one for each country) indicate a ranking in terms of the effectiveness of healthcare spending: across all levels of healthcare spending, healthcare is more effective in the UK than in Sweden, in Sweden than in the Netherlands, and in the Netherlands than in the US and Hungary. Somewhat surprisingly, this ranking is in close agreement with empirical studies on healthcare across different countries; see Section 5.2. Third, the fact that the efficacy functions of the US and Hungary intersect, shown in Figure 2 , has an interesting interpretation: it is likely that the US has more advanced medical technology, while Hungary's healthcare system is more efficient; see Section 5.2.1. The takeaway is that the model-generated efficacy function seems informative enough to reflect various healthcare-related realities. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes Epstein-Zin utilities over one's random lifetime, with healthcare spending incorporated. Section 3 introduces the problem of optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare spending under Epstein-Zin preferences, and derives the related HJB equation and a general verification theorem. Section 4 presents the main results in order of complexity, characterizing an optimal strategy of consumption, investment, and healthcare spending in three different settings of aging and access to healthcare. Section 5 calibrates our model to mortality data in various countries, and discusses important implications. Most proofs are collected in Appendices.
Epstein-Zin Preferences with Healthcare Spending
Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space equipped with a filtration F = (F t ) t≥0 that satisfies the usual conditions. Consider another probability space (Ω , F , P ) supporting a random variable Z that has an exponential law P (Z > z) = e −z , z ≥ 0.
(2.1)
We denote by (Ω,F,P) the product probability space (Ω × Ω , F × F , P × P ). The expectations taken under P, P , andP will be denoted by E, E , andĒ, respectively. Consider an agent who obtains utility from consumption, partially determines his lifespan through healthcare spending, and has bequest motives to leave his wealth at death to beneficiaries. Specifically, we assume that the mortality rate process M of the agent evolves as
2)
where h = (h t ) t≥0 , a nonnegative F-progressively measurable process, represents the proportion of wealth spent on healthcare at each time t, while g : R + → R + is the efficacy function that prescribes how much the natural growth rate of mortality β > 0 is reduced by healthcare spending h t . For anyω = (ω, ω ) ∈Ω, the random lifetime of the agent is formulated as
3)
The information available to the agent is then defined as G = (G t ) t≥0 with
(2.4)
That is, at any time t, the agent knows the information contained in F t and whether he is still alive (i.e. whether τ > t holds); he has no further information of τ , as the random variable Z is inaccessible to him. Finally, we assume that the agent can leave a fraction ζ ∈ (0, 1], not necessarily all, of his wealth at death to beneficiaries, reflecting the effect of inheritance and estate taxes.
Remark 2.1. The controlled mortality (2.2), introduced by Guasoni and Huang [15] , is based on the assumption that healthcare expenses affect mortality growth relative to wealth rather than in absolute terms. While this is a modeling simplification, there are empirical and theoretical justifications for it; see [15, p.319 ] for details.
Now, let us define a non-standard Epstein-Zin utility process that incorporates healthcare spending. First, recall the Epstein-Zin aggregator f :
5)
where γ and ψ represent the agent's relative risk aversion and EIS, respectively, as stated in Section 1. Given a consumption stream c = (c t ) t≥0 , assumed to be nonnegative F-progressively measurable, and a healthcare spending process h = (h t ) t≥0 introduced below (2.2), we define the Epstein-Zin utility on the random horizon τ to be a G-adapted
where we use the notationĒ t [·] =Ē [·|G t ]. In (2.6), we assert that the loss of wealth at death results in a decreased bequest utility, by a factor of ζ 1−γ . This assertion will be made clear and justified in Section 4, where a financial model is in place; see Remark 4.3 particularly.
To solve (2.6) for the process V c,h , let us first introduce a general formulation of infinite-horizon BSDEs that will be used throughout the paper.
if for any T > 0 there exists an F-martingale (M t ) t∈[0,T ] such that (2.7) holds for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Remark 2.2. Without a terminal condition, (2.7) can have infinitely many solutions. Indeed, as long as G admits proper monotonicity, there are solutions to (2.7) that satisfy "lim t→∞ V t = ξ for F-measurable random variable ξ" or "lim t→∞ E e ρt V t → 0 for ρ > 0"; see [7] and [12] . We will address this non-uniqueness issue by enforcing appropriate "terminal behavior"; see Remark 2.5.
The next result shows that the G-adapted V in (2.6) can be expressed as a function of τ and an F-adapted process V that satisfies an infinite-horizon BSDE.
Proof. See Section A.1.
In view of Proposition 2.1, to uniquely determine the Epstein-Zin utility process V , we need to find a suitable class of stochastic processes among which there exists a unique solution to (2.9). To this end, we start with imposing appropriate integrability and transversality conditions. Definition 2.2. For any k ∈ R, define Λ := δθ+(1−θ)k. Then, for any nonnegative F-progressively measurable h, we denote by E h k the set of all F-adapted semimartingales Y that satisfy the following integrability and transversality conditions: Remark 2.4. The constant Λ := δθ + (1 − θ)k in (2.11) can be negative, even when k > 0 (as will be assumed in Section 4). In such a case, (2.11) stipulates that M h must increase fast enough to neutralize the growth of e −Λt , such that the transversality condition can be satisfied.
We now introduce the appropriate collection of strategies (c, h) we will focus on. A comparison result for BSDE (2.9) can now be established.
The next result is a direct consequence of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2.
Hence, the Epstein-Zin utility V c,h can be uniquely determined via (2.8).
Problem Formulation
Let B = (B t ) t≥0 be an F-adapted standard Brownian motion. Consider a financial market with a riskfree rate r > 0 and a risky asset S t given by
where µ ∈ R and σ > 0 are given constants. Given initial wealth x > 0, at each time t ≥ 0, an agent consumes a lump-sum c t of his wealth, invests a fraction π t of his wealth on the risky asset, and spends another fraction h t on healthcare. The resulting dynamics of the wealth process X is
, π is F-progressively measurable, and a unique solution X c,π,h to (3.2) exists.
The agent aims to maximize his lifetime Epstein-Zin utility V c,h 0 by choosing (c, π, h) in a suitable collection of strategies P, i.e.
where the equality follows from (2.8) . In this section, we only require P to satisfy
4)
A more precise definition of P, depending on the specification of β, γ, and ζ, will be introduced in Definition 4.2 below. The focus of this section is to derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for (3.3) and establish a versatile verification theorem under the general condition (3.4).
A General Verification Theorem
Under the current Markovian setting (i.e. (3.1) and (3.2)), we take
Namely, the optimal value should be a function of the current wealth and mortality. The relation (A.10), derived from (2.6), suggests the following dynamic programming principle (DPP): With the shorthand notation p = (c, π, h) and p s = (c s , π s , h s ) for s ≥ 0, for any
, assuming enough regularity of v, we get
where the operator L a,b,d [·] is defined by
for any κ ∈ C 2,1 (R + × R + ). We can then rewrite (3.6) as
The HJB equation associated with v(x, m) is then
Equivalently, this can be written in the more compact form
We establish a general verification theorem for v(x, m) in (3.5).
Then, the following holds.
(ii) Suppose further that there exist Borel measurable functionsc,π,h :
Consider an arbitrary p = (c, π, h) ∈ P. For any T ≥ 0 and t ∈ [0, T ], by applying Itô's formula to w(X p s , M h s ), we get
). On the other hand, (3.4) implies that (c, h) is k-admissible, so that there exists a unique solution V c,h ∈ E h k to (2.9) that satisfies (2.12) (Theorem 2.1). Since w is a solution to (3.8) , and equivalently to (3.9), we have
We then conclude from Proposition 2.
If (c * , π * , h * ) ∈ P, we can repeat the arguments in part (a), obtaining (3.14) with the inequality replaced by equality. This shows that
is a solution to (2.9). Also, (3.4) implies that (c * , h * ) is k-admissible, so that there is a unique solution V c * ,h * ∈ E h * k to (2.9) satisfying (2.12) (Theorem 2.1). As W * also satisfies (2.12), we must have
Reduction to an Ordinary Differential Equation
If we assume heuristically that w xx < 0, w m < 0, g is differentiable, and the inverse of g is well-defined, then the optimizers stated in Theorem 3.1 (ii) can be uniquely determined as
Moreover, the maximizers in (3.15) now becomē
These maximizers indeed characterize optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare spending, as will be shown in the next section.
The Main Results
In this section, we present the main results progressively: Section 4.1 deals with the simplest case with neither aging nor healthcare; Section 4.2 handles the scenario with aging but without healthcare, which serves as a baseline for the general model with both aging and healthcare in Section 4.3.
Let us now formulate the set P of permissible strategies (c, π, h) in the optimization problem (3.3). First, take k ∈ R in Definition 2.2 to be
so that Λ ∈ R in Definition 2.2 becomes
Definition 4.1. Let P 1 the set of strategies (c, π, h) such that (c, π, h) ∈ H k * , (X c,π,h ) 1−γ satisfies (2.11) (with Λ ∈ R therein taken to be Λ * ) as well as E sup s∈[0,t] π s (X c,π,h s ) 1−γ < ∞ for t ≥ 0. Let P 2 be defined as P 1 , except that the second part of (2.11) is replaced by
Definition 4.2. The set of permissible strategies (c, π, h), denoted by P, is defined as follows.
(i) For the case β = 0 and g ≡ 0 (i.e. with neither aging nor healthcare), P := P 1 ;
(ii) For the case β > 0 (i.e. with aging),
When there is aging (β > 0), for the case γ > 1 and ζ ∈ (0, 1), we need (X c,π,h ) 1−γ to satisfy the slightly stronger condition (4.3) (than the transversality condition in (2.11)), so that the general verification Theorem 3.1 can be applied; see Appendix B.2 for details.
Neither Aging nor Healthcare
When the natural growth rate of mortality is zero (β = 0) and healthcare is unavailable (g ≡ 0), the mortality process is simply constant, i.e. M t ≡ m. Consequently, in the HJB equation 
Furthermore, c * t :=c 0 (m)X t , π * t := µ γσ 2 , and h * t := 0, for t ≥ 0, form an optimal control for (3.5). Proof. See Section B.1. Proposition 4.1 shows that in the absence of aging and healthcare, the optimal investment rate is the classical Merton's proportion, while the optimal consumption rate is the constantc 0 (m), dictated by the fixed mortality m. By (3.18), for the case ζ = 1,c 0 (m) ≡ ψδ + (1 − ψ) r + 1 2γ µ σ 2 no longer depends on m. Indeed, when there is no loss of wealth (and thus utility) at death, dying sooner or later (i.e. how large m is) does not make a difference to an agent who maximizes lifetime utility plus bequest utility at death. Note that for the specific case ψ = 1/γ, Proposition 4.1 reduces to [15, Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 4.1] under time-separable utilities.
As ζ 1−γ −1 1−γ < 0 for all 0 < γ = 1, we observe from (3.18) that a larger mortality rate m induces a larger consumption rate due to EIS ψ > 1. This can be explained by the usual substitution effect in response to negative wealth shocks: a larger mortality rate encourages the agent to consume more (i.e. consumption substitutes for saving) before the loss of wealth at death.
Aging without Healthcare
When the natural growth of mortality is positive (β > 0) but healthcare is unavailable (g ≡ 0), the mortality grows exponentially, i.e. M t = me βt , consistently with the Gompertz law. Thanks to g ≡ 0 and v(x, m) being nondecreasing in x by definition, the second supremum in the HJB equation The next result shows that this type of differential equations can be solved explicitly. If k * in (4.1) is strictly positive, then u q is the unique solution to the ordinary differential equation
Proof. As the results follow from analogous arguments in [15] , we only sketch the proof. First, similarly to (A.8) in [15] , (4.6) admits the general solution
To ensure lim q→0 u(m) =c 0 (m), we need C = 0, which identifies the corresponding solution as 
where u β : R + → R + is defined as in (4.5), with q = β. Furthermore, c * t := u β (me βt )X t , π * t := µ γσ 2 , and h * t := 0, for t ≥ 0, form an optimal control for (3.5). 
As ψ > 1 and 1−ζ 1−γ 1−γ > 0 for all 0 < γ = 1, the condition k * > 0 ensuresc 0 (m) > 0 for all m > 0. This, together with u β >c 0 ((4.7) with q = β), shows that k * > 0 in Proposition 4.2 is essentially a well-posedness condition, which guarantees that the optimal consumption rate u β (me βt ) is strictly positive for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, with q = β, Lemma 4.1 (a) stipulates that aging enlarges consumption rate, but the increase does not exceed the growth of aging β > 0; in addition, this upper bound is asymptotically reached as mortality increases indefinitely. Note that the increase in consumption results from the same substitution effect as discussed below Proposition 4.1. Lemma 4.1 (b) further describes how the optimal consumption rate increases with mortality: as the agent is young (i.e. m is small), it increases steeply; as the agent is old (i.e. m is large), it grows asymptotically linearly, with the same slope (ψ − 1) 
Aging and Healthcare
For the general case where the natural growth of mortality is positive (β > 0) and healthcare is available (g ≡ 0), we need to deal with the equation (3.17) in its full complexity. To this end, we impose the following condition on g. Assumption 1. Let g : R + → R + be twice differentiable with g(0) = 0, g (h) > 0 and g (h) < 0 for h > 0, and satisfies the Inada condition g (0+) = ∞ and g (∞) = 0, (4.9)
as well as g (I (ψ − 1)) < β with I := (g ) −1 .
(4.10)
Condition (4.10) was first introduced in [15] . Its purpose will be made clear after the optimal healthcare spending strategy h * is introduced in Theorem 4.1; see Remark 4.2. 
12)
where u * : R + → R + is the unique nonnegative, strictly increasing, strictly concave, classical solution to (3.17) . Furthermore, (c * , π * , h * ) defined by
is an optimal control for (3.5).
Proof. See Section B.2.
Theorem 4.1 identifies the marginal efficacy of optimal healthcare spending, g (h * t ), to be inversely proportional to m(u * ) (m) u * (m) , the elasticity of consumption with respect to mortality, where the constant of proportionality depends on EIS ψ. Note that a larger EIS implies less healthcare spending, as (g ) −1 is strictly decreasing. In a sense, healthcare spending is like saving: it crowds out current consumption, but potentially enlarges future consumption by extending one's lifetime. Since a larger EIS means a stronger substitution effect (as discussed below Proposition 4.1), one substitutes more consumption for saving-like healthcare spending with a larger ψ.
Although the optimal consumption rate u * (m), the solution to (3.17), does not admit an explicit formula, it does have simple upper and lower bounds thanks to (4.11) . The lower bound is u β (m), the consumption rate in a model where healthcare is unavailable, but mortality grows at the lower rate β < β, low enough that the agent would be willing to give up access to healthcare in exchange for such a slower natural growth of mortality. The upper bound is the minimum between the consumption rate in the case of aging without healthcare (i.e. u β (m) in Section 4.2), and the consumption rate in the case of neither aging nor healthcare (i.e.c 0 (m) in Section 4.1) plus the adjusted growth rate β. These bounds for u * are crucial for verification arguments in the proof of Theorem 4.1, as well as the calibration in Section 5.
Note that for the specific case ψ = 1/γ, 
where the last inequality is due to (4.10). In other words, (4.10) stipulates that optimizing healthcare spending can only reduce, but not reverse, the growth of mortality. 
i.e. the loss of wealth at death reduces utility by a factor of ζ 1−γ , confirming the setup in (2.6).
Calibration and Implications
In this section, we calibrate the model in Section 4.3 to mortality data in various countries. We focus on examining (i) whether our model properly explains the change of mortality over time, and (ii) the shape of the efficacy function g and its implications to a country's healthcare quality. We take as given the following values: r = 1%, δ = 3%, ψ = 1.5, γ = 2, ζ = 50%, µ = 5.2%, and σ = 15.4%. A safe rate of r = 1% approximates the long-term average real rate on Treasury bills reported in [4] , and the time preference δ = 3% is also consistent with estimates therein; ψ = 1.5 corresponds to the estimate obtained in [3] ; γ = 2 follows the specification in [21] and [33] ; market parameters µ = 5.2% and σ = 15.4% are taken from the long-term estimates in [19] ; ζ = 50% is a rough estimate of inheritance and estate taxes in developed countries. Note that these values ensure k * > 0 in (4.1). On the other hand, the efficacy function g : R + → R + is taken to be g(z) = a z, with a > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1).
The equation (3.17) then becomes
and the optimal healthcare spending process h * is now given by
where u * is the unique solution to (5.2) . The endogenous mortality is then
We calibrate β > 0, a > 0, q ∈ (0, 1), and m 0 > 0 to mortality data in the US, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Hungary. For each country, the natural growth rate of mortality β > 0 is estimated from mortality data for the cohort born in 1900, assuming no healthcare available. Given this β > 0, the healthcare parameters a > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1) in (5.1), as well as the initial mortality m 0 > 0, are calibrated by matching the endogenous mortality curve (5.3) with mortality data for the cohort born in 1940, through minimizing the mean squared error (MSE). Calibration results are listed in Table 1 . Figure 1 presents the model performance under two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the cohort born in 1900 essentially had no access to healthcare, so that its mortality grew exponentially with the Gompertz law. The blue line is then obtained simply by linearly regressing actual mortality data (the blue dots). Second, we assume that the cohort born in 1940 had full access to healthcare. We then compare the model-implied mortality (the red curve) with actual mortality date (the red dots). Although these assumptions are crude approximations, they are in place due to several realistic considerations, as explained in [15, Section 5.2] . It is confirmed in Figure 1 that our model has the ability to reproduce declines in mortality that are very close to the ones observed historically. Moreover, when compared with [15, Figure 5 ], Figure 1 clearly provides a better fit. This improvement can be attributed to the use of Epstein-Zin utilities (so that γ and ψ can both take empirically relevant values), the inclusion of risky assets, modifications of calibration methods, or a combination of all three.
Mortality
The success of our model is not limited to the US data. Figure 3 evaluates the model performance using mortality data in Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, and Hungary. In all cases, the model-implied mortality (the red line) closely approximates actual mortality data (the red dots).
Another way to evaluate the performance of our model is to compare it with linear regression. Indeed, without any idea of healthcare, one can model the actual mortality of the 1940 cohort by a simple linear regression (as we did for the 1900 cohort). As shown in the last two columns of Table  1 , our model outperforms linear regression significantly, across all countries considered. Specifically, the sixth column of Table 1 reports the MSEs under our model, much smaller than those under linear regression in the seventh column. Table  1 . Intriguingly, it indicates a ranking among countries in term of the effectiveness of healthcare spending: across all levels of healthcare spending, healthcare is more effective (in reducing mortality growth) in the UK than in Sweden, in Sweden than in the Netherlands, and in the Netherlands than in the US and Hungary. There is no clear-cut comparison between the US and Hungary, as their efficacy functions intersect. These two countries will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.1.
The Efficacy Function g
Somewhat surprisingly, the model-implied ranking in Figure 2 is in close agreement with empirical data and studies on healthcare across different countries. A common measure of the effectiveness of healthcare spending in a country is life expectancy versus healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP. Figure 4 presents such data for numerous countries, and the black line represents the average performance of all the countries. The UK is above average, while Sweden and the Netherlands are both close to average; the US and Hungary are two outliers far below average. This is consistent with the ranking in Figure 2 . Certainly, there are more comprehensive, multifacetd measures of healthcare. Davis et al. [8] provide an overall ranking of healthcare for countries, based on quality of care, access to care, efficiency, equity, and general healthiness of citizens. Among the 11 countries evaluated, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the US ranked number 1, 3, 7, and 11, respectively. This precisely coincides with the ranking in Figure 2 . 3
Medical Technology versus Efficiency of Healthcare
We observe in Figure 2 that the efficacy functions of the US and Hungary intersect. When healthcare spending increases, its efficacy continues to grow in the US, while levels out in Hungary. A possible explanation is that there is more advanced medical technology in the US: more spending in the US means more advanced medical technology kicked in to raise the efficacy continuously. If there is no parallel medical technology available in Hungary, more spending will be to no avail eventually, as suggested by Hungary's efficacy function.
Nonetheless, when healthcare spending is small, it is apparently more effective in Hungary than in the US (see Figure 5 ). This potentially indicates that the healthcare system in Hungary is more efficient. Smaller spendings typically cover more basic, standard medical treatments that are available in both the US and Hungary. A more efficient healthcare system is likely to provide faster, wider, and more economical access to these treatments, thereby raising the efficacy more than a relatively fragmented system (such as the one in the US). Indeed, for any fixed ω ∈ Ω, consider A t (ω) := {ω ∈ Ω :
where the second and the last equalities follow from Fubini's theorem for conditional expectations (see e.g. [26, Theorem 27.17] ), the third equality is due to the tower property of conditional expectations and (A.2), the fourth equality results from c s ∈ F s and V c,h s ∈ F s , and the fifth equality is a consequence of (A.1). On the other hand, forP-a.e. fixedω = (ω, ω ) ∈Ω, consider the cumulative distribution function of τ given the information F T ∨ H t , i.e.
It follows that
where the first line results from V τ − = V τ − (thanks to (A.2)), the second line follows from the tower property of conditional expectations, and the third line is due to the density formula in (A.4). Note that since V is right-continuous, it has at most countably many jumps on [t, T ], so that we may use V s (instead of V s− ) in the last term of (A.5). Finally,
where the first equality follows from the tower property of conditional expectations and (A.2), the second equality is due to V c,h T ∈ F T , and the third equality is a consequence of (A.1). Now, combining (A.3), (A.5), and (A.6), we obtain from (2.6) and
where we use the notation E t [·] = E [·|F t ]. This, together with (A.2), particularly implies
For any ω ∈ Ω, since there exists ω ∈ Ω such that 1 {t<τ }(ω,ω ) = 1 (in view of (2.3) and (2.1)), we conclude from (A.8) that V t (ω) = E t,T (ω). We can then simplify (A.7) as
Now, note that the above equation directly implies
is an F-martingale on [0, T ], thanks to (A.10). Applying generalized Itô's formula for semimartingales (see [20, Theorem I.4 .57]) to
r dr dM s is again an F-martingale. Hence, V is a solution to BSDE (2.9). This, together with (A.9), yields the desired result.
A.2 Derivation of Proposition 2.2
Recall the generator F defined in (2.10). 
where the second equality follows from the definition of Λ and θ = 1−γ 1−1/ψ . 
and consider the stopping time θ := inf s ≥ t 0 : V 1 s ≤ V 2 s . Applying generalized Itô's formula (see [20, Theorem I.4 .57]) to e − t
Observe that
where the first inequality follows from F (c s , M h s , V 2 s ) ≤ G(s, V 2 s ), and the second inequality is due to Lemma A.1. Note that Lemma A.1 is applicable here as V 1 s > V 2 s for s ∈ [t, θ). Thanks to the above inequality, 
where the second inequality follows from the right continuity of V 1 and V 2 : indeed, the right which is a direct consequence of (B.7) and π * t ≡ µ γσ 2 being a constant process, we can argue as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that W * t is a solution to (2.9). Moreover, by direct calculation,
Asc 0 (m) = k * + (ψ − 1) 1−ζ 1−γ 1−γ m (see (4.8) ), this shows that (2.12) is satisfied with k = k * . Hence, (c * , h * ) is k * -admissible, so that we can conclude (c * , π * , h * ) ∈ P. Theorem 3.1 is then applicable to our setting, asserting that w(x, m) = v(x, m) and (c * , π * , h * ) optimizes (3.5). Since (X p ) 1−γ satisfies (2.11) (thanks to p ∈ P = P 1 ), the above inequality implies that W also satisfies (2.11).
• Case (i)-2: γ > 1 and ζ < 1. As p ∈ P = P 2 , there exists η ∈ (1 − 1 γ , 1) such that (4.3) holds. Consider the constants
as well as the process First, we claim that the process F is bounded from above; more specifically,
where the second equality follows as u β solves (4.6) with q = β. (1 − γ) r + 1 2γ
where Z t is the driftless geometric Brownian motion defined below (B.5), and the second inequality follows from (B.20). It follows that
where Z t is the driftless geometric Brownian motion defined below (B.5), and the inequality follows from (B.23). It follows that e −Λ * t E e −α t 0 Msds (X * t ) 1−γ ≤ x 1−γ e 
